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Abstract 
Public deficit figures are subject to revisions, as most macroeconomic aggregates are. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Europe, the latter could be particularly worrisome given the role 
of fiscal data in the functioning of EU’s multilateral surveillance rules. Adherence to such rules 
is judged upon initial releases of data, in the framework of the so-called Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) Notifications. In addition, the lack of reliability of fiscal data may hinder the 
credibility of fiscal consolidation plans. In this paper we document the empirical properties of 
revisions to annual government deficit figures in Europe by exploiting the information 
contained in a pool of real-time vintages of data pertaining to fifteen EU countries over the 
period 1995-2008. We build up such real-time dataset from official publications. Our main 
findings are as follows: (i) preliminary deficit data releases are biased and non-efficient 
predictors of subsequent releases, with later vintages of data tending to show larger deficits 
on average; (ii) such systematic bias in deficit revisions is a general feature of the sample, 
and cannot solely be attributed to the behaviour of a small number of countries, even though 
the Greek case is clearly an outlier; (iii) Methodological improvements and clarifications 
stemming from Eurostat’s decisions that may lead to data revisions explain a significant 
share of the bias, providing some evidence of window dressing on the side of individual 
countries; (iv) expected real GDP growth, political cycles and the strength of fiscal rules also 
contribute to explain revision patterns; (v) nevertheless, if the systematic bias is excluded, 
revisions can be considered rational after two years. 
 
JEL Classification: E01; E21; E24; E31; E5; H600. 
Keywords: data revisions; real-time data; news and noise; fiscal statistics; rationality. 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
Al igual que la mayoría de los datos macroeconómicos, las cifras de déficit público están 
sujetas a revisiones. Sin embargo, en el caso de Europa, estas podrían ser especialmente 
preocupantes dado el papel que desempeñan los datos fiscales en el funcionamiento de las 
reglas de supervisión multilateral a nivel europeo. El grado de cumplimiento de dichas reglas 
se juzga sobre la base de las publicaciones iniciales de datos de déficit público en el marco 
de las notificaciones del Procedimiento de Déficit Excesivo (PDE) europeo. Asimismo, la falta 
de fiabilidad de los datos fiscales puede menoscabar la credibilidad de los planes de 
consolidación. Este artículo muestra las propiedades empíricas de las revisiones de las cifras 
anuales de déficit en Europa a partir de la información ofrecida por un panel que contiene las 
diferentes notificaciones en tiempo real para 15 países de la UE a lo largo del período 
comprendido entre 1995 y 2008. Esta base de datos en tiempo real se ha construido a partir 
de las publicaciones oficiales. Los principales resultados son: (i) las publicaciones iniciales de 
cifras de déficit contienen un sesgo y no constituyen predicciones eficientes de publicaciones 
posteriores, de forma que las notificaciones posteriores tienden a mostrar mayores déficits de 
media; (ii) dicho sesgo sistemático en las revisiones de los déficits públicos es un rasgo 
general de la muestra y no puede atribuirse únicamente al comportamiento de un reducido 
número de países, aún cuando Grecia es claramente un caso atípico; (iii) las mejoras 
metodológicas y las aclaraciones por parte de Eurostat que pueden dar lugar a revisiones 
explican gran parte del sesgo, lo que podría indicar un cierto grado de maquillaje por parte de 
los países; (iv) el crecimiento esperado del PIB, el ciclo político y la fuerza de las reglas 
fiscales también ayudan a explicar parte de las pautas que se observan en las revisiones de 
los datos, y (v) dejando de lado el sesgo sistemático, las revisiones pueden considerarse 
como racionales transcurridos dos años desde la publicación del dato inicial.      
Códigos JEL: E01; E21; E24; E31; E5; H600. 
Palabras clave: revisiones de datos; datos en tiempo real; señal y ruido; estadísticas 
fiscales; racionalidad. 
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1 Introduction 
The international press has been echoing, especially since October 2009, the strong and 
recurrent revisions to the Greek fiscal figures. Indeed, even though Greek fiscal figures have 
been under scrutiny by the European Commission (Eurostat) at least since the early 2000s, 
renewed attention is being paid to this case. After almost two decades of Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) missions to Greece led by Eurostat,1 as late as November 2010 Eurostat still 
expressed reservations on the quality of the data reported by Greece’s statistical institute 
(NSSG) for 2009, on issues such as social security funds’ accounting, the classification of 
some public entities or the recording of off-market swaps. Figure 1 illustrates the successive 
revisions to Greek fiscal deficit figures reported over the period 1999-2009.2 
Recently, some voices have been asking whether revisions to Greek fiscal data are 
representative of Europe’s fiscal reporting system or, conversely, they are just an isolated 
occurrence that can be explained by Greece’s idiosyncratic factors. In this respect, the 
European Commission stated that “EU fiscal data were generally of high quality and Greece 
represented a one-off problem. However, it cautioned that it lacked audit powers and so 
relied heavily on the goodwill and integrity of member-states to supply accurate data” (FT, 12 
January 2010). In the same fashion, the President of the ECB recently stated that “while the 
government finance statistics of the overwhelming majority of the Member States is reliable, 
this does not yet apply to all of them”.3 
Beyond the Greek case, revisions of fiscal data have been reported as being sizeable 
in some European countries (Gordo and Nogueira Martins, 2007; Balassone et al., 2007). This 
is exemplified in Figure 1 for the budget deficit data in the cases of Italy and Portugal in the 
early 2000s.  Nonetheless, other countries such as Spain or Germany have revealed more 
stable revision patterns, as also illustrated in Figure 1. 
The reporting of fiscal data is at the heart of EU’s multilateral surveillance rules. 
Adherence to such rules is judged upon initial data releases by EU Member States, in the 
framework of the EDP Notifications4, one of the bases of Europe’s Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). Under the SGP, any deviation of government deficits5  from the reference value of -3% 
of GDP in the base year (not considered to be corrected over a given forecast horizon) leads 
to the adoption of corrective actions. In this case, the country concerned has to engage in a 
path of deficit reduction to be approved by the Council of Ministers of the European Union. 
Frequent and/or sizeable revisions of fiscal data may give rise to concerns about the reliability 
of the official EDP statistics used in the monitoring of the SGP. This is the case because 
                                                                          
1. The first EDP mission to Greece took place in 1993. 
2. A comprehensive report on the reasons for the exceptional revisions to the Greek data since 2004 can be found at 
Eurostat webpage: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
3. Opening address by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB at the fifth ECB conference on statistics “Central bank 
statistics: what did the financial crisis change?”, Frankfurt, 19 October 2010. The complete paragraph of the quote is: 
“First, the reliability of the general government statistics underlying the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and 
Growth Pact must be guaranteed when they come out. While the government finance statistics of the overwhelming 
majority of the Member States is reliable, this does not yet apply to all of them. Yet as we are in a highly integrated union, 
we need reliable statistics not just from the majority of Member States —we need it from each and everyone, no matter 
how large or how small the country is. We have seen that the potential for loss of credibility affects the entire union”. 
4. Refer to Section 2.1 for an explanation on the EDP reporting. 
5. The reference’s economic sector is the general government sector (S.13) in national accounts, which is composed by 
central government, state government (if applicable), local government and social security sub-sectors. For simplification, 
in our paper we refer to “government” as equivalent to “general government sector”.  
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revisions of fiscal data may imply that a country might appear ex-post as a no compliance 
case with the SGP, whereas at the time of the initial reporting this was not the case. This 
situation would have no consequences de facto as no EDP procedure is opened when the 
country breaches the -3% of GDP deficit threshold in year t+2 and beyond. As mandated in 
Article 6(1) of Regulation 479/2009, EU Member States shall inform Eurostat of “any major 
revision” of statistics to the already reported data. However, the legal act does not specify any 
thresholds. 
Even though the production of fiscal data in Europe is the responsibility of 
independent national statistical institutes and is subject to scrutiny by the European 
Commission (Eurostat), from a political economy point of view some governments might have 
incentives to resort to creative accounting practices so that initially released figures are 
distorted (see Kohen and Van de Noord 2005; Leal et al. 2008). Indeed, as regards concerns 
on fiscal statistics, some official communications point to “the need and means to upgrade 
the quality of budgetary statistics”.6 In addition to the issue of statistical reliability, frequent 
past data revisions imply shifts in subsequent targeted/projected paths over the medium term 
given that government targets and projections are linked to the base year in which these 
targets/projections are produced. When sizeable fiscal data revisions become a stylised fact, 
the credibility of government targets is at stake. In the cases in which revisions do not present 
a clear recurrent pattern but are nonetheless frequent, the comparison of successive paths of 
government targets might be blurred, and may eventually undermine the soundness and 
consistency of fiscal policy choices over time. 
Revisions in government deficit figures should, in principle, be explained by updates 
in the underlying statistical sources and/or by methodological improvements and changes in 
accounting standards (see McKenzie, 2006, and Bier et al., 2004). Due to the fact that 
national statistical authorities have up to four years to provide final data on government deficit 
(and debt) figures, there are inevitable margins of uncertainty in relation to first releases of 
figures. Even if these changes may lead to an improvement in the reliability of the fiscal data, 
they may also complicate the EDP process, if the values of the EDP government deficit (or 
surplus) for a given year systematically change whenever new data are notified. In addition, 
revisions to the government deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios could stem from revisions in 
nominal GDP (denominator effect). 
The literature analysing revisions of fiscal data is relatively scarce. Exceptions are 
Balassone et al. (2006, 2007), that compare public deficits and changes in debt as alternative 
fiscal indicators in Europe; on the basis of their analyses and some case studies for the period 
2000-2004, they argue that one of the shortcomings of the deficit indicator is the fact that it is 
subject to significant revisions. On different grounds, but also for EU countries, Bier et al. 
(2004), and Gordo and Nogueira Martins (2007) follow descriptive approaches to analyse the 
properties of the revisions in EDP deficit and debt figures, mainly by analysing the size of the 
revisions, the size of deficits or the volatility of the revisions.  
In this paper, we extend the literature that analyses the properties of fiscal data 
revisions in Europe along the lines of the related literature on revisions of macroeconomic 
                                                                          
6. See Council Regulation No 2103/2005 (OJ L337, 22.12.2005, p. 1) amending Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 as 
regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure. Furthermore, the amendment of 
the Council Regulation (EC) No 365/2009 to strengthen the auditing powers of Eurostat to improve the quality of the 
fiscal data used under the EDP process (including the reliability) was adopted on 26 July 2010 (Council Regulation (EU) 
No. 679/2010). On borderline statistical issues see, for example, the ad-hoc Eurostat’s advice in the clarification of 
complex statistical issues or the monitoring of the correct application of Eurostat Decisions.  
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variables (Aruoba 2008; Clements and Galvao, 2010; Coenen et al., 2005; Croushore and 
Stark 2001; Garrat and Vahey 2006; Patterson and Heravi 2004; Swanson and van Dijk 
2006; and the references quoted therein). In doing so, we aim at addressing the following 
issues for general government deficit statistics: are initial fiscal data releases unbiased 
estimates of the final values?; are revisions large compared to the initially reported values?; 
are initial releases rational forecasts of finally revised government deficits?; and, are revisions 
predictable using the information set at the time of the initial reporting?7 
Figure 1: Revisions in government deficit-to-GDP ratios in selected EU countries. 
  
                                                                          
7. The literature has analysed extensively the properties of revisions to fiscal projections. For a survey see Leal et al. 
(2008). A recent contribution is von Hagen (2011).Within this branch of the literature, Beetsma et al. (2011) analyse the 
underlying reasons behind deviations from budgetary plans specified in Stability and Convergence Programmes. They 
conclude that fiscal plans tend to be optimistic when compared with Autumn t-1 estimates of first-release outcomes for 
year t.  
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The standard analyses in the literature look at the n vintages of a given (long) time 
series (typically US quarterly GDP or Industrial Production). On the contrary, we analyze the n 
vintages of (short) government deficit time series for a cross-section of fifteen EU countries 
(data from 1995 to 2008). We use pool estimations to answer the above questions. This is the 
first paper to deal with the issues at hand using cross-section data. Furthermore, along the 
lines of Swanson and van Dijk (2006), we examine the entire revision history of government 
deficits. This means that for each calendar date, we cover a complete historical record of the 
actual values available at different release dates. Hence, we can study the behaviour of the 
entire revision process of the variable of interest in detail, and analyse up to what point a 
preliminary release is a reliable estimate of the final data.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in 
the paper and provides some descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we tackle the issue of 
rationality of early releases and the relation between different vintages of data. Firstly, we test 
the news vs. noise hypotheses, carrying out the standard analysis but with pooled data; 
secondly, we incorporate additional explanatory variables, like real-time real GDP growth 
forecasts, the distance to the next general election, the European Commission’s fiscal rule 
index and a set of dummy variables that measure Eurostat’s methodological decisions on 
borderline and pending statistical issues. Finally, Section 4 provides the main conclusions of 
the study. 
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2 The real-time dataset 
2.1 Government deficit data source 
In the framework of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), Eurostat regularly publishes via 
official press releases government deficit actual data (statistics), compiled from data notified 
by EU Member States. Notifications have a biannual frequency. Council Regulation (EC) 
3605/93 stated that Member States had to report biannually, in Spring and Autumn,8 actual 
government deficits figures9 to the European Commission (Eurostat). Actual data (statistics) 
published in year t have to cover year t-4 up to year t-1 figures (4 years). 
We use these publicly available press releases by Eurostat as published from Spring 
1999 (news release 20/99, published on 8 March 1999) to October 2009, to build up our 
database for fifteen EU countries, namely Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, for the period 1995 to 2008. Along the reporting period covered by our 
sample two key institutional pieces were broadly stable: a homogeneous fiscal policy 
framework (SGP) and a homogeneous monetary policy framework (conducted by the 
European Central bank in the case of euro area countries). 
All in all, our sample covers 15 countries, 2 press releases per year reporting 4 years 
of statistics, and 14 years of data; given that different vintages of data contained a different 
amount of information, our sample contains 1320 data points, i.e. slightly less than 15 x 2 x 
14 x 4 points. Our dataset contains eight vintages for years 1998 to 2005, six vintages for the 
years 1997 and 2006, four vintages for years 1996 and 2007, and two vintages for years 
1995 and 2008. 
In order to provide a broader perspective to EU fiscal data revisions, we also added 
as a memorandum item in some tables the US case for a sample period comparable with that 
used for European countries. US government deficit data are based on the National Income 
and Products Accounts (NIPA) methodology, which deviates to some extent from the 
SNA2008, and does refer to the federal government (i.e. central government). We use data for 
the period 1995-2009 that were released on a quarterly basis between March 2001 and 
September 2010 by the Federal Reserve (in the context of the Flow of Funds Accounts). 
Thus, we have 243 data points given that different vintages of data contained a different 
amount of information with a maximum of 19 revisions for each year containing the whole 
history of data releases for six years, i.e. 1996-2005. After 2 years, data are barely revised 
though. Nonetheless, in order to keep consistency with the European countries, only the 
releases corresponding to the first and the third quarters in each year have been used to 
gauge the relevant statistics. 
2.2 Other variables 
We have also compiled a number of other variables, which will be introduced in different parts 
of the analysis. 
                                                                          
8. Since the adoption of the Council Regulation (EC) 2103/2005 amending Council Regulation (EC) 3605/93, 
the reporting deadlines are before 1 April and 1 October of each year —instead of 1 March and 1 September, as initially 
mandated. 
9. According to Article 2 (2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, “Actual government deficit and government 
debt level figures means estimated, provisional, half-finalised or final results for a past year”. 
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First, revisions to government deficit-to-GDP figures might be partly due to revisions 
in macroeconomic aggregates, given the role of nominal GDP as denominator of the ratio. We 
compiled revisions to GDP statistics from EDP notifications (press releases) as described 
above for government deficit figures. 
Second, revisions in fiscal statistics can be due to imperfections in the data collection 
process and incomplete information at the time of initial reporting. For instance, data from 
local governments (and state governments when applicable) are typically available with a 
longer time lag. 
Third, political economy considerations suggest that governments may have some 
incentives to conceal deficits if macroeconomic conditions are adverse. This is the case 
because unfavourable economic conditions, per se, worsen government deficits, in particular 
via the operation of automatic stabilizers. In such situation, a government might decide to 
influence the Statistical Institute, so that it reports a lower-than-observed deficit, postponing 
part of the increase in the deficit for subsequent revisions (most likely in good times). As a way 
of testing these hypotheses, we use a real-time dataset of real GDP growth (statistics and 
projections by the European Commission) for the 15 countries included in our study. In order 
for the exercise to mimic as much as possible the constraints and incentives faced by 
governments, this database resembles the structures of vintages of fiscal data revisions, and 
has been compiled directly from European Commission reports.10  
Fourth, political budget cycles may influence the incentives of governments to report 
true fiscal figures, in particular because of the political costs derived from the initiation of an 
EDP procedure; in addition, a government may increase spending prior to an election and 
hide the emerging budget deficit, exploiting temporary information asymmetries.11 We aim at 
capturing these effects by including country dummy variables that display a value of one in an 
election year and a zero otherwise. We took these data from Armingeon et al. (2008) for the 
period 1999-2005, and extended the variables by ourselves for 2006-2008. The variables 
used in the empirical analysis of Section 3 will be the standard ones in the literature: the 
election dummy as such, the election dummy lagged (pre-election year) and moved forward 
(post-election year), and a transformation of the original variable to measure proximity to 
elections, computed as a continuous variable as follows (see Franzese, 2000, 2002, Mink and 
de Haan, 2005). If the day when the election takes place lays in the current year t, the 
indicator, call it ELEC, at t takes the value: ELEC = [(M-1) +d/D] / 12, where M is the month of 
the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days in that month. For the 
year prior to the election year the indicator takes the value: ELEC = [12–(M-1)–d/D]/12. For all 
other years the value of the indicator is zero. 
Fifth, we took the fiscal rule index constructed by the European Commission in order 
to assess to what extent revision patterns are affected by the presence of different types of 
fiscal rules insofar as they may pose a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in 
terms of a summary indicator of fiscal outcomes, such as the government budget balance, 
debt, expenditure, or revenue developments. The role of fiscal rules in this framework is 
assessed because they aim at not only enhancing budgetary discipline, but also fostering 
policy coordination between different levels of government. Moreover, fiscal rules may further 
                                                                          
10. We are greatly indebted to Richard Morris and Michal Slavik for sharing with us their real-time database on real GDP 
growth (data and EC projections).  
11. On the role of electoral cycles on budgetary outcomes see, for example von Hagen (2010), Hallerberg et al. (2007) or 
Mink and de Haan (2005), and the references quoted therein. 
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contribute to the reduction of uncertainty about future fiscal policy developments. However, 
fiscal rules can only yield these benefits if appropriate institutions for monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are in place, or if they are supported by strong political 
commitment.  
This index is based on all types of numerical fiscal rules (budget balance, debt, 
expenditure, and revenue rules) at all levels of government, in force in the period 1990-2008. 
The index of strength of fiscal rules uses information on (i) the statutory base of the rule; (ii) the 
body in charge of monitoring the respect of the rule; (iii) the body in charge of enforcement of 
the rule; and (iv) the enforcement mechanisms relating to the rule. It is constructed by 
summing up all fiscal rule strength indices in force in the respective Member State weighted 
by the coverage of general government finances of the respective rule (i.e. public expenditure 
of the government sub sector(s) concerned by the rule over total general government 
expenditure). If two rules apply to the same general government sub-sector, then the rule with 
the higher fiscal rule strength index score obtained weight one, while the other weaker rule 
was assigned weight 0.5. 
Finally, we compile dummy variables that encompass revisions to government deficit 
figures due to methodological improvements or clarifications, as mandated by Eurostat. GDP 
revisions and political cycles’ influences reflect idiosyncratic country factors behind deficit 
revisions, while interventions by Eurostat should represent common improvements of the 
statistical system. In this respect, apart from general improvements in the European statistical 
system, the so-called Eurostat decisions reflect the need for detailed monitoring of practices 
by national statistical institutes that often tend to exploit to the limit the interpretation of 
existing legislation, typically aiming at concealing certain operations/issues that could increase 
government deficits. In this respect, a majority of Eurostat decisions lead to an increase in the 
deficit of the country concerned. 
The compilation of these variables deserves some attention. Methodological 
improvements can be due to several reasons: (i) the implementation of Eurostat’s decisions 
on complex statistical borderline issues12; (ii) Eurostat’s advice clarifying the implementation of 
the national accounts framework or due changes in accounting methods (for instance, full 
accrual recording). The metadata information necessary to create the dummy variables has 
mainly been obtained from the annexes to EDP notifications as published in Eurostat’s bi-
annual press releases.13 It must be noted that there is a substantial increase of information 
published since the systematic publication on the specific reasons for major revisions (Annex 
1 of the Eurostat’s press releases), which started in Autumn 2005 EDP press release. In 
notifications prior to 2005, some metadata information has been identified under the sections 
“reservations and amendments”, and so we had to exert some judgement.  
Some remarkable examples of events included in the dummy variables (see Table A1 
for all event) are worth mentioning: Greek data was revised to a large extent due to the 
recording of EU transfers (2001-2007), hospital expenditures and assumption of liabilities 
(2001-2004), military expenditure (2000-2003), or securitisation operations (1997-1998); 
Denmark and Sweden had observations (2003-2005) strongly impacted by the Eurostat’s 
decision on the re-classification of funded pension schemes (2 March 2004); in the case of 
                                                                          
12. See for a comprehensive list of the methodological decisions since 1997: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/methodology/decisions_for_GFS. 
13. In the case of Greek figures it was also necessary to resort to the report on Greek government deficit and debt 
statistics from the European Commission (Eurostat) (8 January 2010). 
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Belgium, Eurostat amended its deficit (and debt) notified in Spring 2007 for the years 2005 
and 2006 in relation to the assumption by the government in 2005 of 7,400 million euro (2.5% 
GDP) of the debt of the SNCB (railway public company); for Spain, in Autumn 2007, the 
deficit for the period 2003-2006 was revised to be in line with Eurostat’s advice on the 
reclassification of capital injection into ADIF (railway public company) as capital transfers; 
finally, the change from ESA79 to ESA95 affected all countries in the Spring 2000 EDP 
Notification, also for the back data from 1996 to 1998.14 
2.3 Some definitions 
The variable of reference we are interested in is the government deficit (-) / surplus (+) as a 
percent of GDP. Some remarks are worth mentioning in this respect. First, government 
deficit is defined as the balancing item net borrowing (net lending) (EDP B.9) of the 
general government sector.15 Second, GDP refers to annual nominal GDP as defined 
in National Accounts. Third, we are interested in revisions of the government deficit as a 
percent of GDP because the deficit-to-GDP ratio is indeed the policy variable of interest, 
and the basis over which policy decisions are taken. 
The information in our dataset is organized according to the date in which the 
government deficit for a given year is published (a vintage). In this respect, the government 
deficit as a percent of GDP for year t (dt) published in a given date (vintage, ) will be denoted 
by dt, for = 1, 2,…, m. 
Following the literature, a sequential revision is defined as 
 
rt= dt - dt (1) 
 
while the total or cumulative revision between the first and the Jth vintage is 
 
rtJ= dtJ - dt (2)
 
In particular, the total or cumulative revision between the first and the last vintage 
would be rtm= dtm - dt. Given the semi-annual nature of our data and the fact that a figure is 
considered to be final after four years, m=8 is the last vintage and consequently rt8 is the total 
or cumulative revision between the first and the final vintage. 
2.4 Unconditional properties of the sample 
Ideally, if well-behaved, revisions should: (i) have zero mean (each release should be an 
unbiased estimate of the final value); (ii) not be “large” in the sense of having a small 
variance compared to the variance of the final value, and (iii) the final revision should be 
unpredictable given the information set at the time of the initial announcement; if revisions 
were predictable, initial releases would not be optimal forecasts of the finally revised values. 
 
                                                                          
14. With the exception of Greece for the years 1996 to 1998. Greek back data figures based on ESA95 were published 
in Spring 2001. 
15. As defined in the Protocol No. 12 on the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union and in Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of revisions in government deficit-to-GDP ratios, by 
year, for the pool of countries. Selected vintages. 
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
All 
years
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revision after 4 years: 
r8t = d
8
t - d
1
t
Mean -0.34*** 0.02 0.02 -0.33 -0.85* -0.66** -0.59* -0.30 -0.02
Standard deviation 1.05 0.45 0.45 1.01 1.74 1.00 1.11 0.88 0.95
Noise-to-signal ratio 0.43
Nº of observations 119 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 15
Country info (7 observations per year, all years)
Mean Noise-to-signal ratio
Austria -0.60 1.45
Belgium -0.26 0.68
Denmark -0.30 0.34
Finland 0.09 0.09
France 0.00 0.13
Germany -0.14 0.07
Greece -1.96 1.05
Ireland 0.04 0.28
Italy -0.59 0.30
Luxembourg 0.73 0.33
Netherlands -0.04 0.28
Portugal -0.57 0.56
Spain -0.33 0.13
Sweden -0.99 0.31
UK -0.17 0.08
Memo: US -0.14 0.13
Revision after 3 years: 
r6t = d
6
t - d
1
t
Mean -0.18** 0.07 0.01 -0.20 -0.61* -0.59** -0.49 -0.08 0.01 0.24*
Standard deviation 0.83 0.48 0.42 0.60 1.26 0.95 1.14 0.44 0.91 0.49
Nº of observations 135 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Revision after 1 year: 
r3t = d
3
t - d
1
t
Mean -0.02 0.07 0.17 -0.01 -0.23 -0.17 -0.32 0.14 -0.08 0.21* 0.03
Standard deviation 0.62 0.44 0.63 0.24 0.84 0.39 1.06 0.41 0.82 0.42 0.33
Nº of observations 150 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Revision within the 1st 
year: r2t = d
2
t - d
1
t
Mean 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.24 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.19
Standard deviation 0.53 0.17 0.56 0.24 0.65 0.24 0.85 0.51 0.74 0.22 0.27 0.72
Nº of observations 165 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Country means (7 observations per year, all years)
Austria 0.04
Belgium -0.11
Denmark 0.01
Finland -0.05
France 0.01
Germany -0.01
Greece -0.35
Ireland -0.05
Italy -0.06
Luxembourg 0.66
Netherlands 0.01
Portugal -0.19
Spain 0.02
Sweden 0.05
UK 0.06
Memo: US -0.16
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Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of cumulative revisions to deficit-to-GDP 
ratios (as defined in equation 2) for some selected vintages, for the pool of countries, as well 
as some country-specific information. It presents revisions after four years (final revisions 
within the 4-year reporting period), after three years, after one year, and within the first year of 
publication (Autumn EDP notification vs. Spring EDP notification). In each case we show the 
sample mean and the sample standard deviation. In addition, in the panel that displays total 
revisions (rt8) we also show the “noise-to-signal ratio”, defined as the standard deviation 
of revisions divided by the standard deviation of the initially reported value; this latter statistic 
gives an intuition about the size of final revisions relative to the size of the originally reported 
variables. Finally, for illustrative purposes, we also show some information for individual 
countries, even though it has to be taken with caution given the limited number of 
observations available.  
Some features are worth highlighting from Table 1. First, for the pool of countries and 
years, cumulated revisions (rt8) do present a significant negative bias, i.e. the final publication 
of the deficit of the government (after four years) tends to be, on average over countries 
and over years, higher than initially published. Within the first year (rt2) the mean revision is not 
statistically different from zero, and also the revision after one year (rt3), while after three years 
(rt6) the significant negative bias is already noticeable. Moving across vintages, sequential 
revisions, on average over countries and years, turned out to go always in the direction of 
deepening the negative bias. 
Second, there is heterogeneity across time in the sample. The negative bias shows 
up between 2000 and 2004 (for rt8), years that presented below-average GDP growth figures, 
especially in years 2001 to 2003. Interestingly, the first revisions available for 2008 (rt2), also a 
“bad times” year, present a negative sign on average.16 “Good times” years (1998-1999, 
2005-2007) present either positive or non-significant total (or partial) revisions.  
Third, there is cross-country heterogeneity in the sample. This is evident from the 
somewhat high standard deviations per year, so that hardly half of the computed sample 
means per year would be statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, the negative bias 
in total revisions (rt8) seems to be a strong feature of our sample, as eleven out of fifteen 
countries show a negative mean of rt8. 
Fourth, initially revised figures suffer little revision within the first year (rt2), the most 
relevant from a policy point of view. This is observed for the pool, but also for individual 
countries. Indeed, revisions within the first year were on average very small for most 
countries, except for Greece (-0.35 points of GDP), Portugal (-0.19 points of GDP), 
Luxembourg (+0.66 points of GDP) and, to a lesser extent, Belgium (-0.11 points of GDP). 
Only for Germany and Italy, i.e. some 30% of the sample, the sign of the first revision (rt2) was 
a correct indicator of the sign of the total revision (rt8). 
Finally, the “noise-to-signal ratio” of 0.43% of GDP in final revisions (rt8) for the pool of 
countries and years, given a sample mean of -0.34% of GDP in absolute terms, indicates that 
final revisions are sizable compared to original values. There is substantial cross-country 
dispersion in this indicator, with Austria, Greece and Belgium in the upper extreme (with 
                                                                          
16. “Bad time” periods led in many cases to the opening of several Excessive Deficit Procedures. Between 2001 and 
2003 Portugal, France, and Germany were under EDP. In 2004 EDPs were opened for Greece and the Netherlands, 
while Italy and the United Kingdom were subject to an EDP in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
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values of 1.45, 1.05 and 0.68, respectively), and Germany, the United Kingdom and Finland 
at the lower end of the distribution (with values of 0.07, 0.08 and 0.09, respectively). 
In Table 1 we also report some statistics for the US case for illustration purposes, as 
the number of available observations is limited (one per year, as explained in a previous 
subsection). As regards total revisions (rt8), the mean over all years for the US is -0.14 (revision 
to more deficit), well below the mean deficit revision of -0.34 for the pool of European 
countries, but similar in size to countries like Germany or the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, 
most of the total revision was completed within the first year, a key difference with the 
average European country, and each one of them. 
Table 2 shows some statistics of sequential revisions. These are revisions that 
occurred between two consecutive vintages, irrespective of the point in time in the overall 
revision process (rt as defined in equation 1). Sequential revisions were on average negative, 
though small, at half a tenth of a percentage point per vintage; indeed, eleven out of fifteen 
countries presented average negative sequential revisions, but only in five cases can the 
number be considered as statistically different from zero, namely Austria, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. In the latter three cases, the negative bias arises from a tendency to 
revise downwards whenever there was a revision (the three countries show a remarkable 
number of no-revisions, and a ratio of downwards-to-upwards revisions above 3). Greece 
shows a downward revision ratio totally out of line with the rest of countries, with a number 
close to 55%; on the extreme, Luxembourg is the only case with a positive and significant 
average of sequential revisions, that at the same time shows one of the highest numbers of 
downward (negative) revisions (38%). Even though sequential revisions do cumulate, on 
average, little by little to total revisions, there are some exceptional cases in which high 
revisions occurred from one vintage to the next (see “Minimum” and “Maximum” columns); 
these cases tend to be associated with Eurostat exceptional decisions, as discussed above.  
Sequential revisions were not outstandingly frequent overall, with the notable 
exception of Greece, given the moderate standard deviations and the fact that in around 50% 
of the cases no revisions were observed (column “No revision ratio”, pool of countries). 
Indeed, in seven countries, the percent of no-revisions was close to or above 60% (Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), and thus the standard deviation of 
sequential revisions turned out to be low in those cases. 
Table 2 also reports, as a memorandum item, statistics of sequential revisions for the 
US. The figures computed for the US are not too different from the average EU country: 
negative average sequential revision (though not different from zero in statistical terms), small 
standard deviation, and downward revisions outweighing upward ones. Two respects in 
which revisions differ are: (i) maximum and minimum revisions are substantially smaller; and (ii) 
the percent of no-revisions is in the upper range of EU countries. Point (i) might signal higher 
stability of the statistical reporting system itself, given that highest revisions (in absolute value) 
in the EU are due to Eurostat decisions clarifying borderline cases or introducing 
methodological improvements. Nonetheless, these discrepancies show up due to revisions 
mostly in small countries, while deeper inspection shows that these statistics in the US are 
broadly in line with those for the largest EU countries, especially Germany, France, Spain or 
the United Kingdom. 
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Table 2: Sequential revisions in government deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
Revisions in government balances-to-GDP ratios can stem either from government 
balances, GDP figures or both, as shown in Table 3. Interestingly, despite revisions in GDP 
figures account for some share, revisions in deficit ratios are mainly due to genuine fiscal 
revisions. Table 3 shows that the contribution of revisions in nominal government balances is, 
on average, more than 10 times as large as the contribution of GDP revisions. In turn, the 
contribution of nominal GDP revisions to the overall revision in the deficit-to-GDP ratio was on 
average quite stable across vintages, moving from 0.00 in the first revision, to around 0.02 in 
the 8th revision on average after four years; this is in contrast with the tendency to higher 
deficit in subsequent revisions of this variable. 
The descriptive analysis presented in tables 1, 2 and 3, can be summarized in the 
following stylized facts: (i) final, cumulated revisions do present a significant negative bias 
(higher deficit in the final vintage than initially published). This is a robust feature of the sample, 
even though there is cross-country heterogeneity; (ii) there is also heterogeneity across time, 
in such a way that government deficits initially reported for a “bad time year” (a year that 
displayed adverse or below-average economic circumstances) tend to be revised upwards 
(more deficits); (iii) revisions to deficit-to-GDP ratios are due to genuine fiscal revisions, i.e. 
mostly reflect revisions to nominal government deficit figures; (iv) even though sizeable 
sequential revisions do occur occasionally, they are on average small and negative, thereby 
contributing to the negative bias in total deficit revisions; (v) final revisions are sizable 
compared to initial releases; (vi) revisions to US fiscal data are commensurate to the average 
EU country, even though, in the latter case sequential revisions tend to be more volatile, in 
particular due to the existence of occasionally extreme values (Eurostat decisions); (vii) Greece 
Mean  Standard 
deviation
Downward 
revision 
ratio
Upward 
revision 
ratio
No 
revision 
ratio
Minimum 
sequential 
revision
Maximum 
sequential 
revision
Number of 
observations
Pool EU countries -0.04*** 0.34 30% 21% 49% -2.90 2.00 1109
Austria -0.07* 0.32 38% 14% 49% -2.50 0.40 74
Belgium -0.03 0.31 23% 28% 49% -2.40 0.40 74
Denmark -0.03 0.42 32% 30% 38% -1.20 1.20 74
Finland 0.01 0.15 18% 24% 58% -0.50 0.40 74
France 0.00 0.06 12% 12% 75% -0.20 0.20 73
Germany -0.01 0.11 22% 19% 59% -0.40 0.40 74
Greece -0.28*** 0.79 54% 20% 26% -2.90 1.80 74
Ireland 0.01 0.15 31% 34% 35% -0.40 0.50 74
Italy -0.05* 0.20 27% 8% 65% -0.80 1.00 74
Luxembourg 0.11** 0.43 38% 47% 15% -1.00 2.00 74
Netherlands -0.01 0.15 26% 18% 57% -0.60 0.50 74
Portugal -0.09** 0.29 34% 8% 58% -1.90 0.20 74
Spain -0.06*** 0.17 32% 9% 58% -0.90 0.20 74
Sweden -0.08 0.42 27% 22% 51% -1.70 1.70 74
UK -0.01 0.12 32% 20% 47% -0.30 0.50 74
Memorandum item:
USA -0.01 0.28 21% 11% 68% -0.80 0.30 85
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1106 
is clearly an outlier in all considered respects. Therefore, the analysis so far leads us to 
conclude that the first two desired properties of revisions are not satisfied. 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of revisions in government deficit-to-GDP ratios: deficit, 
nominal GDP and other (residual) factors. Pool of years. 
Nominal 
deficit
Nominal 
GDP Rest
Revision after 4 years: 
r8t = d
8
t - d
1
t
Pool of countries -0.34 -0.39 0.02 0.03
Austria -0.60 -0.55 0.00 -0.05
Belgium -0.26 -0.20 0.00 -0.06
Denmark -0.30 -0.28 0.00 -0.03
Finland 0.09 0.14 -0.02 -0.04
France 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.02
Germany -0.14 -0.12 0.03 -0.04
Greece -1.96 -2.74 0.18 0.60
Ireland 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.06
Italy -0.59 -0.58 0.04 -0.05
Luxembourg 0.73 0.70 -0.09 0.12
Netherlands -0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.07
Portugal -0.57 -0.79 0.11 0.11
Spain -0.33 -0.39 0.01 0.05
Sweden -0.99 -0.66 -0.10 -0.22
UK -0.17 -0.26 0.03 0.06
Revision after 3 years: 
r6t = d
6
t - d
1
t
Pool of countries -0.18 -0.21 0.02 0.01
Revision after 1 year: 
r3t = d3t - d1t
Pool of countries -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
Revision within the 1st 
year: r2t = d
2
t - d
1
t
Pool of countries 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01
Austria 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.01
Belgium -0.11 -0.11 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.07
Finland -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.00
France 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
Germany -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03
Greece -0.35 -0.31 0.00 -0.05
Ireland -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
Italy -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.02
Luxembourg 0.66 0.69 -0.02 -0.01
Netherlands 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Portugal -0.19 -0.18 0.01 -0.02
Spain 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01
UK 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
due to revisions in
Mean of 
revisions in 
the deficit-to-
GDP ratio
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3 Rationality of revisions 
The analysis in the previous Section hints that initial releases by national statistical authorities 
are not unbiased estimates of the final values, and that revisions are large compared to 
originally reported values. A significant mean revision would also imply some degree of 
predictability of the final value on the basis of previously reported data. In this Section we try 
to substantiate the previous preliminary conclusions based on descriptive statistics, by means 
of detailed econometric analysis. In particular, we aim at assessing to what extent initial 
releases are unbiased and rational forecasts of finally revised deficits. This analysis, given the 
structure of our dataset, will exploit and control for observed heterogeneity both across time 
and country dimensions. 
3.1 News or noise? 
Even though the presented descriptive statistics provide interesting information, they do not 
provide valid enough inference about how the information available is used, i.e. they do not 
provide a notion of the efficiency of the estimation process, in the sense of whether revisions 
between two consecutive vintages incorporate the relevant “news” embedded in the newly 
available information, or rather reflect “noise” in the production of the previous estimate. 
Research in the area of testing rationality of preliminary announcements is based mainly on 
the framework put forward by Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), linking the first and final releases of 
data. Their setup aims to determine whether dt: (i) is a noisy estimate of the fully revised data
 
dtm; (ii) is an efficient forecast of the fully revised data dtm; or (iii) neither of the two previous 
alternatives. In the first case, “noise”, the initial preliminary announcement of the government 
deficit would be an observation of the final value of the government deficit, measured with 
error. This implies that the revision is uncorrelated with the final value but correlated with the 
data available when the announcement is made. Conversely, if the initial release is an efficient 
and rational forecast of the final estimate, “news”, the revision should be correlated with the 
final value and uncorrelated with the first release data.  
This setup can be used, in general, to link two consecutive vintages (Swanson and 
van Dijk, 2006). In the first case, “noise”, the revision does not contain any new information. In 
the second case, “news”, the change in the estimate of the variable of interest from one 
vintage to the next can be attributed to the incorporation of new information. The latter 
hypothesis is the most interesting from a theoretical point of view, given that the general goal 
of a sequence of revisions is to approach some “true” value of the variable of interest 
(benchmarking), following a learning path that incorporates new information at the time of 
each revision (Fixler, 2007). A standard way of testing for the “news” and “noise” hypotheses 
is as follows (Mankiw and Shapiro, 1986; Faust et al., 2005; Arouba, 2008). Let rtjbe the 
revision between vintage  and +j, and consider the following regression framework 
 
rtj= 1 + 1 dt + t (3) 
rtj= 2 + 2 dtj + t (4) 
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Testing for the “news” hypothesis amounts to not rejecting the null hypothesis H0: 
1=0 and 1=0, while at the same time rejecting H0: 2=0 and 2=0. More intuitively, if 1=0 
and 1=0, revisions are not correlated with the estimate for vintage ; this does not imply 
automatically that they are correlated with the estimate for vintage j and so the second 
hypothesis has to be tested and rejected in order to confirm that indeed revisions, rtj, 
are correlated with the estimate corresponding to vintage  j dt j (given that 2≠0). In the 
same fashion, testing for the “noise” hypothesis amounts to not rejecting the null hypothesis 
H0: 2=0 and 2=0, while at the same time rejecting H0: 1=0 and 1=0. An important remark 
has to be made: both sets of hypotheses, H0: 1=0 and 1=0 and H0: 2=0 and 2=0, can be 
rejected or not rejected at the same time, thus leading to an inconclusive result. This result 
is particularly common in the literature when the mean revision is not equal to zero. 
Table 4 shows the estimations corresponding to equations (3) and (4). All equations 
have been estimated by pooled generalized least squares, and include fixed effects when 
the relevant test indicates they are significant (redundant fixed effects test).17 The first column 
of Table 4 presents the revision between the initial releases of data (1) and the final 
revisions (the 8th publication); clearly, in this case, the hypotheses 1=0 and 1=0 are rejected, 
not only because of the significant estimated country fixed effects, but also because 1 turns 
out to be statistically different from zero and negative, and so the total revision is (negatively) 
correlated with the initially published figure. This result would give us some indication 
of “noise” in the revision process; nevertheless, the first column of the right panel of Table 4, 
that relates to the total revision, and uses as explanatory variable the final data releases (the 
8th publication), shows that the hypotheses 2=0 and 2=0, are also rejected. Even 
accounting for the significance of the constant (fixed effects), the individual hypothesis 2=0 is 
also rejected. Thus, both the “news” and the “noise” hypotheses are rejected in this case, 
signalling that the revision process is a mixture of “noise” and “news”, and thus the agencies 
are only using in part all available information at each time of publication. 
In addition to the points made in the previous paragraph, the rest of the messages 
that can be extracted from the information included in Table 4 can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, in general, the significantly estimated constants (general and country-specific) jointly 
with slope coefficients different from 1 suggest that there is some “unexploited” information in 
earlier vintages of data that could be used to forecast subsequent data releases; in this 
respect, the production process of fiscal data in our sample is not efficient.18 Secondly, Table 
4 shows that as of vintage 4, earlier vintages of data do not have forecasting power for 
final/total revisions (i.e. 1 can be considered to be zero from a statistical point of view); 
leaving aside the constant/fixed-effects, this is an indication that indeed the revision process 
becomes more efficient from vintage 4 onwards. In fact, subtracting the significantly different 
from zero mean from the revisions and the vintages of data, the “news” hypothesis is not 
                                                                          
17. As signalled by Vahid (1999) the classical homogeneity assumption in panel data analysis is that the slopes of the N 
cross sectional units are equal, after one allows for cross section specific or random fixed effects. This assumption 
is absolutely necessary and non-testable for the analysis of panel data with very small T. Even acknowledging 
the low power of equality-of-slopes tests across cross section units in our sample (as it is usually the case in most 
empirical analysis of this kind), we implemented pairwise tests that showed that the assumption is acceptable. 
Beyond statistical tests, the hypothesis seems reasonable on conceptual grounds. The selected sample period 
was on purpose starting in 1999, given that all considered countries have been subject since then to the same 
accounting rules, whose actual implementation is closely monitored by a common agency (Eurostat) that guarantees 
homogeneity and consistency of application of the rules. This should be true, on average, once controlling for country 
fixed effects. 
18. Equations (3) and (4) have also been estimated for the US. Except for the first and second releases, both the news 
and noise hypotheses are accepted at conventional significant levels. However, due to the relatively low number of 
observations, estimates are highly imprecise and do not allow to draw credible conclusions. 
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rejected for equal to4 and 5. For equal to6 and 7 the hypotheses 1=0 and 2=0 are not 
rejected, leaving the constant/fixed-effects as the only significant explanatory factors.19 
 
Table 4: News-noise and unbiasedness tests. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. The Wald coefficient test follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The estimated coefficients correspond to the fixed-effects specification 
provided that these effects are jointly significant. Otherwise, the no-fixed effects specification is shown. 
When the model was estimated with fixed effects we tested the joint significance of i and i, where i 
was the weighted average of the different 15 fixed effects. Thus, the model can be re-written such that 
the different fixed effects are expressed as deviations from a “common” constant. 
 
 
                                                                          
19. It is worth noting that the methodological change from ESA79 to ESA95 took place in spring 2000, leading to a 
revision of EDP figures for 1996, 1997 and 1998. Such change affected all countries simultaneously except Greece, 
whose deficit figures for 1997 and 1998 were revised one year after. Notwithstanding the fact that this is the only 
Eurostat-enforced decision affecting many countries simultaneously, this event might induce some cross-sectional 
dependence. However, when we controlling for this factor with dummy variables for the relevant years point estimates in 
Table 4 barely change and the conclusions drawn from it remained unaffected. This finding is consistent with Gordo and 
Nogueira Martins (2007), who provide descriptive evidence showing that the change to ESA95 was immaterial for the 
EDP reporting system. 
ν=1 ν=2 ν=3 ν=4 ν=5 ν=6 ν=7 ν=1 ν=2 ν=3 ν=4 ν=5 ν=6 ν=7
dt
ν -0.05** -0.03*** -0.05** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)
dt
8 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.02* 0.04** 0.03*** 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001)
Constant -0.02*** -0.01**
(0.01) (0.01)
Fixed effects
Austria -0.63* -0.69* -0.55 -0.51 -0.43 -0.40 -0.45 -0.58 -0.45 -0.42 -0.35 -0.37
Belgium -0.21 -0.05 -0.060 -0.090 -0.100 -0.100 -0.17 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08
Germany -0.24***-0.19*** -0.25** -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.047 -0.01 -0.08 0.12** 0.07* 0.02
Greece -2.24** -2.13*** -1.57** -1.18** -0.76 -0.49 -1.79** -1.85** -1.3** -0.94 -0.56 -0.42
Denmark -0.25 -0.21 -0.24 -0.17 -0.21 -0.15 -0.51** -0.37* -0.4** -0.28 -0.29* -0.17
Spain -0.38***-0.43***-0.34***-0.22***-0.14*** -0.12** -0.32***-0.40***-0.29***-0.18***-0.08*** -0.1***
Finland 0.28** 0.32*** 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.02 -0.12 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02
France -0.13* -0.11** -0.14* -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.19** 0.10* 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.00
Ireland 0.10 0.12 0.170 0.130 0.12* 0.1* -0.08 -0.002 0.06 0.040 0.06 0.080
Italy -0.66***-0.51***-0.35*** -0.24** -0.19** -0.14* -0.36 -0.31* -0.16 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09
Luxembourg 0.81*** 0.00 -0.010 -0.080 -0.050 -0.090 0.55** -0.19 -0.20 -0.230 -0.16* -0.13
Netherlands -0.04 -0.09 -0.1* -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00
Portugal -0.81***-0.53*** -0.5*** -0.23* -0.23** -0.15** -0.44 -0.29* -0.28* -0.04 -0.09 -0.101*
Sweden -0.61* -0.66* -0.41 -0.48 0.14 0.12 -0.92** -0.91** -0.52 -0.56* 0.11 0.11
United Kingdom -0.25***-0.24***-0.18***-0.13*** -0.09** -0.05* -0.17 -0.20** -0.12** -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
Redundant fixed effects 
test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.13
R2 0.36 0.42 0.34 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.35 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.16 0.00
H0: αi=0, βi=0 
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Nº of observations 119 119 133 133 148 148 164 119 119 133 133 148 148 164
Memorandum item:
Constant estimated in -0.35***-0.36***-0.29***-0.21***-0.13*** -0.1*** -0.3*** -0.33***-0.25***-0.18***-0.09***-0.09***
model without fixed-effects (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Equation (3):  rt8,ν= α1 + β1 dtν + εtν Equation (4):  rt8,ν= α2 + β2 dt8 + εt8
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3.2 More on the rationality of revisions: additional variables 
Beyond the information contained in previous vintages and the presence of systematic 
biases, other explanatory factors may help understand the reasons behind government deficit 
revisions. We isolate two possible groups of additional determinants of revisions: the 
economic situation, as measured by real GDP growth forecasts, and the proximity of 
elections. If the cyclical situation is expected to be adverse, and/or if a general election is 
approaching, governments might have incentives to offer an overly optimistic view about the 
state of public finances, which would presumably lead to downward revisions in the future. 
Conversely, after being appointed in office, governments might be inclined to reassess 
previous budgetary situations, especially after changes in the sign of the government. In order 
to account for these factors we estimate an augmented version of equation (3), along the lines 
of the related literature [see for example Swanson and van Dijk (2006) or Arouba (2008)], 
 
rtν=  +  dtν+  EH[ gH]+ EH[ELECTIONSν]+ tν (5) 
 
where EH[ gH]denotes expected output growth for the publication year of dtν, say H 
(with t<H≤t+4), and EH[ELECTIONSHν] is a measure of the distance to elections also at 
the time of the publication of dtν, i.e. year H. The timing assumption is crucial. Indeed, 
we are interested in analyzing if the revision since , that is rtν, could have been predicted 
at the time of the publication of the government deficit figure, dtν. In fact, at that very time 
is when the motivation to hide deficits for political or economic reasons should show up. 
Thus, our baseline hypothesis of political interferences in the data revision process 
would prescribe that, (i)  is positive, given that in bad times (negative growth) governments 
might have incentives to hide part of the deficit today, and accordingly revisions towards 
higher deficits could be expected, and (ii)  is negative given that the proximity of an election 
would also lead a government to delay a revision towards higher deficit.20 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of equation (5) for the complete history of 
revisions (from the first vintage on to the final one the 8th vintage). Some points are worth 
highlighting. First, the evidence regarding the significance of the constant of the regression (or 
country fixed effects) still holds. Second, up to =3 the preliminary data release is informative 
about future revisions but, as observed in the previous subsection, as of =4 (i.e. after two 
years) it lacks forecasting power. Third, as regards elections,  is negative and significant up 
to =3 thus indicating that the proximity of an election can help forecasting an upcoming 
revision towards more deficit provided that the date the deficit to be revised refers to is 
relatively close; as of to =4 though this variable looses significance. Finally, expected real 
GDP growth also shows up as significant in the year of the initial release and the next one, 
with  displaying the expected positive sign.  
Summing up, two broad conclusions emerge. On the one hand, all the explanatory 
variables do have forecasting power on future revisions, making obvious the lack of rationality 
of initial releases of data as forecasts of finally revised data. On the other hand, once 
accounting for the constant/bias, as of release =4 (i.e. after two years) revisions could be 
considered rational in the sense that none of the explanatory variables are significant (current 
release of data, expected real GDP growth, elections). 
                                                                          
20. These results are broadly consistent with those found in the literature for budgetary forecast errors and budgetary 
outcomes. See for example von Hagen (2010), Hallerberg et al. (2007) or Leal et al. (2008). 
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Table 5: Additional rationality tests.  
Estimation of equation (5):  ):  rtν=  +  dtν+  EH[ gH]+ EH[ELECTIONSν]+ tν 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. The Wald coefficient test follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The estimated coefficients correspond to the fixed-effects specification 
provided that these effects are jointly significant. Otherwise, the no-fixed effects specification is shown. 
 
3.3 Deepening the understanding of the results 
In this subsection we perform a number of exercises aimed, first, at deepening the 
understanding of the results and, second, at assessing their robustness. 
ν=1 ν=2 ν=3 ν=4 ν=5 ν=6 ν=7
dt
ν -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.01 0.001 -0.002
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.007) (0.001)
EH[gH
 0.07*** 0.03** -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.002 -0.001
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002)
EH[ELECTIONSH
ν] -0.17** -0.11** -0.11* -0.08 0.001 0.02 0.01
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.036) (0.016)
Constant -0.05** -0.02**
(0.02) (0.01)
Fixed effects
Austria -0.75** -0.71* -0.5 -0.43 -0.4
Belgium -0.33 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07
Germany -0.32*** -0.2*** -0.18* 0.048 0.00
Greece -2.48*** -2.2*** -1.49** -1.05* -0.70
Denmark -0.33 -0.23 -0.21 -0.1 -0.19
Spain -0.55*** -0.49*** -0.29*** -0.12 -0.09*
Finland 0.12 0.27*** 0.19 0.19 0.09
France -0.29*** -0.15*** -0.08 0.01 -0.02
Ireland -0.27 -0.03 0.21 0.28* 0.18*
Italy -0.76*** -0.52*** -0.29** -0.18 -0.16*
Luxembourg 0.6** -0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.01
Netherlands -0.17 -0.12 -0.05 0.054 0.05
Portugal -0.9*** -0.53*** -0.43*** -0.15 -0.2**
Sweden -0.74* -0.71* -0.32 -0.33 0.16
United Kingdom -0.4*** -0.28*** -0.13*** -0.04 -0.05
Redundant fixed effects
test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.13
R2 0.41 0.43 0.33 0.23 0.16 0.00 0.01
H0: α1=0, β1=0, γ=0, =0  
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nº of pool observations 119 119 134 134 149 149 164
Memorandum items:
Constant estimated in -0.51*** -0.41*** -0.24*** -0.12** -0.09**
model without fixed-effects (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
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In a first exercise we assess the robustness of the selected proxy for political cycles. 
We do so by including in our analysis a number of additional variables employed in the 
literature that studies political cycles (see von Hagen, 2010; Hallerberg et al., 2007; Mink and 
de Haan, 2005). Specifically, we include: (i) a pre-electoral year dummy, which takes a value 
of 1 for years preceding an election year, and zero otherwise; (ii) an electoral year dummy, 
which takes a value of 1 in years in which an election takes place and zero otherwise; (iii) a 
post-electoral year dummy that displays a value of 1 for a year after an electoral year and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, the indicator measuring proximity of elections is a combination of (i) and 
(ii), with weights given by the formulas described in Section 2.2.  
The results are shown in Table 6 (only for =1 for the sake of brevity). The pre-
electoral dummy (column 4) is significant and negative, indicating that, on average, deficits 
corresponding to pre-electoral years tend to be revised upwards (towards more deficit) in 
subsequent data releases. This result is similar to the one using the proximity-of-elections 
variable (column 1). The coefficient of the electoral year dummy variable (column 3) presents 
the expected negative sign, but it is not significantly different from zero. A possible 
explanation can be derived from a class of models analyzing political cycles. As signalled by 
Mink and de Haan (2005), in this set of models it is assumed that the government uses short-
term excess borrowing as a hidden effort – that is, as a policy instrument unobservable to the 
electorate – in order to increase its probability of re-election. But borrowing extra money 
during a pre-election year is more difficult to hide compared to borrowing during an election 
year since information on the pre-election year’s government deficit is likely to be published 
prior to the election date, so that the policy instrument would no longer be unobservable by 
the electorate, and thus may harm government’s target of re-election. Consequently, the 
government has incentives to hide part of the actual deficit in a pre-election year and to revise 
it afterwards, once the election has taken place. Finally, the post-election year dummy 
(column 2) displays a weakly significant positive value, which can be interpreted as an 
indication that newly appointed governments tend to publish deficit figures for the previous 
year as they actually were or even worse (more deficit), because they can blame the previous 
administration.  
In a second exercise, we run the same equations as in Table 6 but including the 
European Commission’s fiscal rules index (FRI). Its inclusion did not alter the results, and the 
fiscal rules index turned out to be non-significant. This is explained because the FRI does not 
vary much over time except for significant changes in the country’s budgetary framework of 
legislative nature. Therefore, the effect of the FRI is concealed by the country fixed effects 
needed in the estimation. Thus, in order to assess the specific role of the FRI aside from other 
country-specific factors, we estimated the same equations as in Table 6 without fixed effects 
and including the FRI. Table 7 shows that in this case, as expected, the coefficient of the FRI 
is positive and significant in all cases; in other words, the more stringent the fiscal rule, the 
more important its contribution to reducing the overall bias towards negative revisions. 
Accordingly, our results support the view that stronger and more binding fiscal rules also 
contribute to enhancing the credibility of (earlier) fiscal data releases.21 
 
 
                                                                          
21. The fact that national budgetary institutions are key determinants of fiscal forecast errors is now a solid stylized fact 
of the extant literature. Along these lines, Beetsma et al.(2011) find that medium term budgeting and stringent fiscal rules 
reduce the optimistic bias embedded in preliminary government forecast for the current year.    
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Table 6: The role of elections: a zoom. Estimation of (5), for ν=1, using different 
definitions of the variable “elections”. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. The Wald coefficient test follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The estimated coefficients correspond to the fixed-effects specification 
provided that these effects are significant. Otherwise, the no-fixed effects specification is shown. 
dt
1 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
EH[gH 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EH[ELECTIONSH
1] -0.17** -0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
Post-electoral year 0.07* 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Electoral year -0.01
(0.04)
Pre-electoral year -0.16*** -0.13***
(0.03) (0.03)
Fixed effects
Austria -0.75** -0.86** -0.84** -0.73** -0.73**
Belgium -0.33 -0.43 -0.41 -0.33 -0.32
Germany -0.32*** -0.42*** -0.41*** -0.32*** -0.31***
Greece -2.48*** -2.6*** -2.6*** -2.47*** -2.45***
Denmark -0.33 -0.42 -0.39 -0.36 -0.35
Spain -0.55*** -0.66*** -0.64*** -0.55*** -0.54***
Finland 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.09
France -0.29*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.28** -0.27***
Ireland -0.27 -0.40 -0.38 -0.30 -0.28
Italy -0.76*** -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.75*** -0.74***
Luxembourg 0.6** 0.48* 0.51* 0.58* 0.59**
Netherlands -0.17 -0.26 -0.24 -0.14 -0.14
Portugal -0.9*** -1.02*** -1.01*** -0.89*** -0.88***
Sweden -0.74* -0.84** -0.81** -0.76** -0.76**
United Kingdom -0.4*** -0.5*** -0.48*** -0.4*** -0.39***
Redundant fixed effects
test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42
H0: α1=0, β1=0, γ=0, =0  
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nº of pool observations 119 119 119 119 119
Memorandum items:
Constant estimated in -0.51*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.51*** -0.5***
model without fixed-effects (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.1) (0.09)
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Table 7: The role of the fiscal rules index. Estimation of (5), for =1, using different 
definitions of the variable “elections”. 
 
A third exercise aims at deepening the understanding of the reasons behind the 
negative bias in deficit revisions. Specifically, we ask ourselves the following question: is there 
some piece of the European statistical framework that might be conductive to this negative 
bias? In order to test this idea, we compiled all the revisions stemming from the 
implementation of Eurostat’s decisions on preliminary country data and on Eurostat’s 
clarifications of the ESA95 rules aiming at upgrading the quality of the whole reporting 
framework. All the events considered are described in Table A1 of the Appendix. On the basis 
of the information in Table A1, we built up a dummy for each vintage of revisions. For 
example, the variable “Eurostat decisions at =2” includes all Eurostat-led revisions affecting 
second notifications; the same reasoning follows for subsequent vintages of data. 
Table 8 shows the results for equation (5), but in this case adding each time the 
corresponding “Eurostat dummies”. Some results are interesting. First, 27 out of the 28 
coefficients shown display a negative sign: all Eurostat-induced revisions led to higher deficits 
on average in our sample. Second, the dummies help rationalize the heterogeneity previously 
captured by country fixed-effects as, after controlling for Eurostat’s dummies, only four 
countries did present significant fixed effects, while the average in prior estimations was at or 
above ten; in addition, as of =3 the redundant fixed effects test signals that there is no need 
to allow for cross-country heterogeneity by means of fixed effects. Finally, the overall bias gets 
reduced in absolute value and looses significance when compared to estimations conducted 
without Eurostat’s dummies. 
 
 
Constant -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.49*** -0.47***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
dt
1 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
EH[gH 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.089*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EH[ELECTIONSH1] -0.07 -0.04
(0.13) (0.13)
Post-electoral year 0.02 -0.03
(0.09) (0.1)
Electoral year 0.04
(0.07)
Pre-electoral year -0.13* -0.128**
(0.07) (0.06)
FRIt 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16*** 0.16**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
H0: α1=0, β1=0 
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H0: α1=0, β1=0, γ=0, =0  
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nº of pool observations 119 119 119 119 119
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Table 8: The role of Eurostat’s methodological decisions. Estimation of (5), adding 
dummy variables on Eurostat decisions. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. The Wald coefficient test follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The estimated coefficients correspond to the fixed-effects specification 
provided that these effects are significant. Otherwise, the no-fixed effects specification is shown. 
 
This evidence is consistent with two opposite points of view. On the one hand, one 
may claim that a big deal of the revisions were due to the still evolving nature of the European 
statistical system, with rules on borderline issues still to be fully settled. On the other hand, an 
alternative argument would be that individual countries tried to manipulate information in 
preliminary publications of data, given that ex-post revisions led to higher deficits, and this 
tendency could have been predicted in real-time; in addition to the information contained in 
earlier releases of data, electoral variables and the state of the economic cycle, some 
countries would have tried to stretch to the limit the common accounting rules, a fact that led 
Eurostat to closely monitor and unveil “window dressing” practices by individual countries. 
ν=1 ν=2 ν=3 ν=4 ν=5 ν=6 ν=7
Eurostat decisions at =2 -1.1***
Eurostat decisions at =3 -0.03 0.02
Eurostat decisions at =4 -0.37 -0.46 -0.54
Eurostat decisions at =5 -0.45** -0.15 -0.08 -0.11***
Eurostat decisions at =6 -1.1*** -0.48*** -0.5*** -0.45*** -0.39***
Eurostat decisions at =7 -0.27 -0.29 -0.75* -0.8* -0.18** -0.18***
Eurostat decisions at =8 -1.18*** -1.04*** -1.18*** -0.72*** -0.65*** -0.43*** -0.44***
Constant -0.12*** 0.04 -0.03 -0.05* -0.01*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01)
Fixed effects
Austria -0.52*** -0.5**
Belgium 0.050 0.100
Germany -0.35*** -0.2**
Greece -0.93 -1.45**
Denmark -0.18 -0.2
Spain -0.26 -0.26
Finland 0.17 0.25***
France -0.23 -0.11
Ireland -0.160 -0.050
Italy -0.35 -0.33
Luxembourg 0.540 -0.110
Netherlands -0.19 -0.13
Portugal -0.47** -0.28***
Sweden -0.67 -0.62
United Kingdom -0.43*** -0.29***
Redundant fixed effects
test (p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.05
R2 0.60 0.52 0.39 0.31 0.20 0.17 0.32
Nº of pool observations 119 119 134 134 149 149 164
Memorandum items:
Constant estimated in -0.27* -0.28***
model without fixed-effects (0.15) (0.07)
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Finally, tables 9 and 10 present results for two clusters of countries with economic 
meaning. First, we group countries according to their size in big and small countries. Second, 
we compare countries that were subject to at least one EDP procedure during the period 
covered by our sample with countries that never were under EDP in that period, i.e. that were 
considered to meet SGP provisions in all the years considered. Some results are interesting. 
 
Table 9: News-noise and unbiasedness tests by country size.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. The Wald coefficient test follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The estimated coefficients correspond to the fixed-effects specification 
provided that these effects are significant. Otherwise, the no-fixed effects specification is shown. 
 
ν=1 ν=4 ν=1 ν=4 ν=1 ν=4 ν=1 ν=4
dtν -0.04*** 0.00 -0.05 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
dt8 -0.01 0.01 0.16*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Constant -0.08**
(0.04)
Fixed effects
Austria -0.64 -0.50 -0.3
Belgium -0.21 -0.08 -0.140
Germany -0.22*** 0.02 -0.15** 0.05
Greece -2.25*** -1.13* -1.38
Denmark -0.23 -0.20 -0.69***
Spain -0.37*** -0.21*** -0.37*** -0.2***
Finland 0.3* 0.07 -0.41*
France -0.12* -0.01 -0.03 0.02
Ireland 0.11 0.11 -0.230
Italy -0.64*** -0.19* -0.58** -0.16*
Luxembourg 0.82*** -0.12 0.340
Netherlands -0.05 0.00 0.09
Portugal -0.83*** -0.19* -0.14
Sweden -0.6* -0.44 -0.98***
United Kingdom -0.25*** -0.11*** -0.23*** -0.1**
Redundant fixed effects
test (p-value) 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.16
R2 0.43 0.30 0.32 0.18 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.08
H0: α1=0, β1=0 
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nº of pool observations 39 44 80 90 39 44 80 90
Memorandum items:
General constant -0.33*** -0.1*** -0.36*** -0.25*** -0.28*** -0.08** -0.38***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.1)
Big countries Small countries
Equation (3):  rt
8,ν= α1 + β1 dtν + εtν 
Big countries Small countries
Equation (4):  rt
8,ν= α2 + β2 dt8 + εt8 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1106 
Table 9 presents the results for the two country size groups. The left panel of the 
Table shows that in both cases total/final revisions are predictable on the basis of the initial 
release of data and the bias (fixed-effects); moreover, in none of the cases has the =4 data 
release explanatory power on subsequent revisions, even though the presence of a bias does 
lead to the rejection of the joint hypothesis of 1=0 and 2=0. Leaving the existence of the 
bias aside, the “news” hypothesis is accepted for the case of the group of small countries, 
while in the case of large countries the “noise” hypothesis is accepted in the case =1. Thus, 
small countries as a group seem to have behaved better with regard to using the information 
in preliminary data releases than large countries. 
Table 10: News-noise and unbiasedness tests for EDP versus non-EDP countries.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. The Wald coefficient test follows a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The estimated coefficients correspond to the fixed-effects specification 
provided that these effects are significant. Otherwise, the no-fixed effects specification is shown. 
ν=1 ν=4 ν=1 ν=4 ν=1 ν=4 ν=1 ν=4
dt
ν -0.08** -0.08*** 0.02 0.04**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
dt
8 0.00 0.01 0.19*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Constant -0.13*** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.04)
Fixed effects
Austria -0.56 -0.24
Belgium -0.20 -0.130
Germany -0.31** -0.17* -0.14** 0.05
Greece -2.32*** -1.38*** -2.13** -1.06*
Denmark -0.4 -0.76***
Spain -0.36*** -0.24**
Finland 0.07 -0.52***
France -0.23* -0.23*** -0.01 0.02
Ireland 0.00 -0.28*
Italy -0.73*** -0.39*** -0.56** -0.16
Luxembourg 0.7** 0.260
Netherlands -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.01
Portugal -0.9*** -0.41*** -0.69*** -0.13
Sweden -0.76** -1.03***
United Kingdom -0.27*** -0.17** -0.23*** -0.1***
Redundant fixed effects
test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.16
R2 0.43 0.50 0.31 0.09 0.33 0.25 0.42 0.17
H0: α1=0, β1=0 
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nº of pool observations 55 62 64 72 55 62 64 72
-0.7*** -0.4*** -0.19*** -0.55*** -0.2*** -0.37***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Equation (3):  rt
8,ν= α1 + β1 dtν + εtν Equation (4):  rt8,ν= α2 + β2 dt8 + εt8 
EDP countries Non-EDP countries EDP countries Non-EDP countries
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Table 10 illustrates he results for the grouping “EDP” vs. “non-EDP countries”). The 
same picture as before applies as regards the presence of a bias: this cannot be rejected in 
any grouping. Nevertheless, for EDP countries the noise hypothesis cannot be rejected, while 
for the group of non-EDP countries, for total revisions (case =1), the news hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. Again, this means that countries that were not subject to an EDP procedure, as a 
group, followed a revision pattern more efficient than that followed by countries subject to an 
EDP procedure, a finding in line with a reasonable political economy prior. 
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4 Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that the reporting system of fiscal data (i.e. general government 
deficit) in the EU can be improved. This general conclusion is substantiated by a number of 
facts, the main ones being the following.  
First and foremost, most preliminary government deficit data releases are biased and 
non-efficient predictors of subsequent releases, with later vintages of data tending to show 
larger deficits than indicated by earlier data releases on average; nevertheless, if the 
systematic bias is excluded, revisions can be considered rational after two years. In addition, 
on average, small countries and/or countries not subject to EDP procedures along the 
analysed time period make a more rational use of the available information than large 
countries and/or countries subject to EDP procedures.  
Second, such systematic bias in government balance revisions cannot solely be 
attributed to the behaviour of a small number of countries; it is rather a general feature of the 
sample, although the Greek case is clearly an outlier in the group of analyzed countries. 
Third, the presence of stringent and binding fiscal rules contributes to enhancing the 
rationality of (earlier) fiscal data releases.   
Fourth, Eurostat’s decisions and methodological clarifications leading to forced data 
revisions explain a great deal of the bias towards larger deficits, providing some evidence that 
some individual countries might have distorted preliminary releases of data by using 
accounting rules in a partial way.  
Finally, expected real GDP growth and political cycles also explain revision patterns, 
with estimated signs supporting the hypothesis that governments tended to conceal deficits 
in electoral and pre-electoral years, and when the economic situation was adverse. 
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APPENDIX. Table A1: Eurostat decisions leading to revisions. 
 
 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK
1999 Spring
Autumn
2000 Spring
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 1997, 
1998
1996, 1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
1996, 
1997, 
1998
Autumn
2001 Spring
1997, 
1998
Autumn
2002 Spring
Autumn 2001 2001
1998,  
1999, 
2000, 
2001
2003 Spring
1999, 
2000, 
2001, 
2002
Autumn 2002
2004 Spring
Autumn 2003
2000, 
2001, 
2003
2005 Spring
2002, 
2003
Autumn
2001, 
2002, 
2003, 
2004
2006 Spring
2002, 
2003, 
2004
Autumn 2005
2002, 
2003, 
2004, 
2005
2003, 
2004, 
2005
2007 Spring
2003, 
2004, 
2005 
Autumn 2006
2003, 
2004, 
2005, 
2006
2005
2008 Spring 2004 2006
Autumn 2004
2004, 
2005, 
2007
2007
2006,
 2007 
2004, 
2005, 
2006, 
2007
2009 Spring
Autumn 2008 2008
2007,
 2008
EDP notification 
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